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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the FTC and the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice together serve to keep domestic mar-
kets free and competitive for the benefit of American consum-
ers.1  One such way these antitrust regulators maintain and
enforce free competition is by blocking potential mergers be-
tween competing firms that would result in higher prices or
lower quality products without creating offsetting positive effi-
ciencies.2  Thus, merger review by antitrust enforcers inher-
ently involves weighing the procompetitive benefits of mergers
against the anticompetitive consequences.  Since 1968, the an-
titrust regulators have evaluated the procompetitive and an-
ticompetitive effects of mergers under the framework of the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.3  Mergers between firms that op-
erate in separate and distinct geographic areas, known as
“cross-market mergers,” present a unique challenge to anti-
trust regulators in performing this balancing test, as the an-
ticompetitive effects of such mergers are unclear.4
Since President Obama signed the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) into law in 2010, there has been a
surge in the number of mergers between healthcare providers,
as firms in the healthcare industry strive to achieve the Act’s
goal of “population health management.”5  Increasingly,
1 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF
MARKET POWER 1–2 (2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
page/files/20160414_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X9V-
2Y7P].
2 See FTC, STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEARS 2003-2008 3 (2003), https://www.ftc
.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports_annual/strategic-plan/spfy03fy08
.pdf [https://perma.cc/GRX5-M5Z2].
3 See W. Stephen Smith & Jeff Jaeckel, Good News, Bad News, or No News?
The U.S. Antitrust Enforcement Agencies’ Commentary on the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 10 M&A LAW., 10, 11 (2006).
4 See Gregory S. Vistnes & Yianis Sarafidis, Cross-Market Hospital Mergers:
A Holistic Approach, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 253, 254–59 (2013).
5 Kenneth L. Davis, Hospital Mergers Can Lower Costs and Improve Medical
Care, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 15, 2014, 7:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
kenneth-l-davis-hospital-mergers-can-lower-costs-and-improve-medical-care-
1410823048 [https://perma.cc/3XAJ-BSXA] (describing the benefits of popula-
tion health management); Anna Wilde Mathews, Health-Care Providers, Insurers
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healthcare mergers are occurring between providers that draw
patients from separate and distinct geographic markets. 6  An-
titrust regulators, following the most recent Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, have been hesitant to challenge these cross-market
mergers because they do not increase the concentration of any
particular geographic market, suggesting that cross-market
mergers do not have a noticeable effect on competition.7  None-
theless, recent studies indicate that cross-market mergers
among healthcare providers raise prices for insurance payors,
and ultimately patients, without producing any improvement
in quality of care.8
This Note argues that the higher prices following cross-
market provider mergers are anticompetitive effects caused by
the merged firm’s increased bargaining power and by the cross-
market subsidization of price increases.  In response to this
finding, antitrust regulators should take a new approach to
reviewing proposed cross-market mergers that focuses on iden-
tifying signals of a potential price increase.9  Ultimately, both
regulators and courts must adapt merger review to address the
unique issues surrounding cross-market mergers.  Part I pro-
vides an overview of how regulators and courts currently review
healthcare provider mergers under the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines.  Part II provides an overview of the current climate
in the market for healthcare services by introducing the players
in the market—providers, payors, employers, and patients—
and examining how they negotiate to arrive at the price for
healthcare services.  Part II also offers an explanation as to why
healthcare providers are so keen to merge following the ACA
Supersize, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2015, 11:46 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
health-care-providers-insurers-supersize-1442850400 [https://perma.cc/
4MD6-PRBD] (noting an increase in healthcare mergers following the passage of
the ACA).
6 Between 1998 and 2012, more than a third of all healthcare provider
mergers occurred between firms operating in different geographic markets. See
Leemore Dafny, Examining Healthcare Competition: Trends in Provider Consoli-
dation 89–90 (Feb. 25, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/sys-
tem/files/documents/public_events/618591/transcript-day2.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/67BZ-KR8F]).
7 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 15 (2010)
[hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (explaining the importance of market
concentration in horizontal merger analysis; market shares and market concen-
tration “can directly influence firms’ competitive incentives”).
8 See Dafny, supra note 6, at 91. R
9 Some commentators note that the FTC is already making greater efforts to
scrutinize mergers of hospitals in adjoining markets. See Lisa Schencker, FTC
Takes Close Look at Advocate, NorthShore Merger, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Apr. 1,
2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150401/NEWS/1504099
88 [https://perma.cc/T48R-RLBS].
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and how such mergers may be beneficial to society.  Part III
then examines both the anticompetitive and procompetitive ef-
fects of cross-market mergers between healthcare providers.
Finally, Part IV proposes a new approach for regulators and
courts to evaluate cross-market mergers aimed at predicting
these potential competitive effects.
I
MODERN FRAMEWORK FOR MERGER REVIEW
A. Evaluation of Healthcare Provider Mergers by Antitrust
Regulators
The ultimate goal of antitrust regulators in reviewing a hor-
izontal merger is to determine whether the merged firm could
exploit an increase in market power following the merger to
raise prices.10  To answer this question, the regulators first
must define the market in which the merging parties operate.
Once the regulators have defined the market, they must evalu-
ate how competitive the market is currently and how competi-
tive it will be following the merger.11  In performing this
analysis, antitrust regulators use “market concentration” as an
indicator of competitiveness, with a higher concentration indi-
cating less competition in the market.12  If the concentration
analysis indicates that the merger is anticompetitive to such an
extent that it will harm consumers, regulators may seek to
block the consummation of the merger in court.13  Additionally,
in cases involving mergers that have already been consum-
mated, the regulators may use actual price effects to demon-
strate that the merger is anticompetitive and may seek a
retroactive remedy such as disgorgement.14
1. Market Definition
In order to determine if a horizontal merger will be an-
ticompetitive, antitrust regulators must identify both the line of
commerce and the section of the country the merger will im-
pact.15  Market definition is based solely on the concept of “de-
10 See Keith N. Hylton, Brown Shoe Versus the Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 95, 97 (2011).
11 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 7–18. R
12 See id. at 18.
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2012).
14 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 3.  The remedy of R
disgorgement requires the merged entity to return profits gained through an
anticompetitive merger. See Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy,
76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 79–80  (2009).
15 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 7. R
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mand substitution”: a consumer’s “ability and willingness to
substitute away from one product to another in response to a
price increase” or a decrease in quality.16  Regulators define the
relevant line of commerce and section of the country using the
“hypothetical monopolist test.”17  Under this test, a market is
defined where a hypothetical monopolist could profitably im-
pose a small but significant and nontransitory increase in price
(SSNIP) for a given product in a delineated geographic area.18
Thus, in a market defined by the hypothetical monopolist test,
consumers are unwilling to substitute for different products or
purchase their products in a different geographic area in re-
sponse to an increase in price by the hypothetical
monopolist.19
The line of commerce, known as the product market, in-
cludes all substitutes a consumer would be willing to accept for
a given good in response to an increase in price.20  In practice,
the product markets for healthcare mergers are divided based
on the specific nature of services provided.  For example, com-
petition for the provision of essential health services occurs in
the product market for “primary” or “secondary” healthcare,
while competition for the provision of more specialized care
occurs in the market for “tertiary” healthcare.21  However, for
the purposes of this Note, the relevant product market may be
generalized as the market for “healthcare services.”
The relevant section of the country in which competition
occurs, known as the geographic market, is defined as the area
beyond which consumers would be unwilling to travel to re-
ceive a substitute good in response to a SSNIP.22  For health-
care provider mergers, the geographic market is the “patient
discharge” area: the area from which the providers attract pa-
tients.23  In choosing healthcare providers, patients are limited
16 Id.
17 Id. at 8–9.
18 See Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, A Practical Guide to the Hypo-
thetical Monopolist Test for Market Definition, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1031,
1035 (2008).
19 See id.
20 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 7. R
21 See Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 891 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“Primary and secondary . . . hospital services are common medical services like
setting a broken bone and performing a tonsillectomy . . . [while] ‘tertiary care’ . . .
includes more complex services like invasive cardiovascular surgery and intensive
neonatal care.”).
22 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 13. R
23 See Michael A. Morrisey et al., Defining Geographic Markets for Hospital
Care, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 171, 176 (1988) (noting that the geographic
market for a hospital may be defined as the area from which the hospital receives
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geographically by travel costs and administrative barriers such
as the extent of coverage offered by the patient’s health insur-
ance plan.24  Travel costs include both the actual price of
transportation as well as the value of the time the patient
spends travelling to a distant provider.
2. Market Concentration
Once the product and geographic markets have been de-
fined, antitrust regulators must evaluate the level of competi-
tion both in the market’s current state and in the market
following the proposed merger.25  The regulators’ first step in
this evaluation is identifying all other firms that earn revenues
in the defined product and geographic markets.26  Such firms
are classified as “market participants.”27  For mergers between
healthcare providers, market participants include all other
healthcare providers within the relevant market.  Next, regula-
tors calculate the market shares for all market participants.28
Typically, the calculation of market share is based on historical
evidence of revenues, but the regulators may also consider any
indicator of the firms’ future competitive significance in the
relevant market.29  For healthcare providers, the number of
hospital beds each firm maintains in proportion to the total
number of beds available within the relevant market serves as
a reasonable proxy for the firm’s market share.30  Regulators
use this market share information to calculate market concen-
tration.31  Based on its concentration, a market falls into one of
three categories: highly concentrated markets, which have the
greatest potential to realize anticompetitive effects; moderately
concentrated markets; and unconcentrated markets, which
have the lowest risk of producing anticompetitive effects.32
Both regulators and courts presume that a merger causing a
large increase in concentration and resulting in a highly con-
virtually all of its admissions; “virtually all” for these purposes is defined as either
75% or 90%).
24 See id. at 170.
25 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 18. R
26 See id. at 15.
27 Id.
28 See id. at 16.
29 See id. at 16–17.
30 See Morrisey et al., supra note 23, at 179. R
31 Typically, market concentration is measured using the Herfindahl-Hirsch-
man Index (HHI), which is calculated by summing the square of each market
participant’s market share. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at R
18–19.  Antitrust regulators identify a market with an HHI greater than 2,500 as
highly concentrated. See id.
32 See id. at 19.
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centrated market is anticompetitive.33  However, this presump-
tion is rebuttable if the merging parties produce evidence
showing that entry into the market by new competitors is easy,
and thus the merger is unlikely to actually increase market
power.34
B. Evaluation of Healthcare Provider Mergers by the
Courts
If the antitrust regulator determines that there is a strong
possibility a healthcare provider merger will have anticompeti-
tive effects, the regulator will pursue a preliminary injunction
in federal court to block the merger before it is consummated.35
In deciding whether to grant this preliminary injunction, the
court must evaluate the likelihood the regulator will succeed on
the merits of an antitrust claim brought under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.36  The court will grant a preliminary injunction
where, after considering the regulator’s likelihood of success on
the merits and weighing the equitable impact of its decision,
granting an injunction would be in the public’s interest.37
Courts typically place great weight upon the market con-
centration analysis presented by the antitrust regulator.38  In
Philadelphia National Bank, the Supreme Court established a
presumption of anticompetitive effects from a merger that
causes a large increase in concentration and results in a highly
concentrated market, holding that:
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue per-
centage share of the relevant market, and results in a signifi-
cant increase in the concentration of firms in that market is
33 Regulators presume that mergers involving an increase in HHI of greater
than 200 and resulting in highly concentrated markets are presumed to enhance
the market power of the merged firm to an anticompetitive level. See id.
34 See id. at 27–29.
35 The Federal Trade Commission, the regulator that evaluates healthcare
mergers, derives its power to seek an injunction in federal court to block an
anticompetitive merger from Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
David M. Stryker, Note, The Federal Trade Commission, Injunctive Relief, and
Allegedly Anticompetitive Mergers: Preliminary Relief Under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 58 IND. L.J. 293, 293 (1982).
36 Section 7 of the Clayton Act holds unlawful any acquisition or merger
where “the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly.”  15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
37 See Stryker, supra note 35, at 298. R
38 See Deborah A. Garza, Market Definition, the New Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines, and the Long March Away from Structural Presumptions, ANTITRUST SOURCE,
Oct. 2010, at 1, 4 (noting that since the Horizontal Merger Guidelines evaluate
mergers in terms of market concentration, “courts have generally assessed merg-
ers that way”).
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so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it
must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing
that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive
effects.39
In recent healthcare merger evaluations, courts have de-
bated how much weight they should place on the merging par-
ties’ asserted nonprice and price efficiencies associated with
the deal.  The parties to a merger that results in an anticompe-
titive level of market concentration under the Philadelphia Na-
tional Bank presumption may claim nonprice efficiencies by
arguing that although prices could increase following the
merger, this increase in price will be more than offset by a
corresponding increase in quality.  Alternatively, the parties
may claim that the merger will produce price efficiencies that
allow the merged firm to lower prices and increase competition
with other market participants.  Improvements in care and
price efficiencies that may result from healthcare mergers are
discussed in greater detail later in this Note.40
Prior to 1982, courts generally ignored the efficiencies de-
fense altogether and essentially held the Philadelphia National
Bank presumption to be conclusive proof of anticompetitive
effects.41  This approach closely tracks the 1968 iteration of the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines and is considered outdated
under more recent iterations of the Guidelines, and therefore it
is seldom used by modern courts.42  Following the publication
of the 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, courts have shown a
willingness to consider efficiencies as evidence to rebut the
regulator’s claim that a merger is presumed to be anticompeti-
tive.43  Modern courts generally consider efficiencies to some
degree in deciding whether a merger should be presumed an-
ticompetitive.44  However, the weight given to the efficiencies
39 Phila. Nat’l Bank v. United States, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
40 See infra subpart III.B.
41 See William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the
Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST
L.J. 207, 213–17 (2003).
42 See id. at 213 (“Unless there are exceptional circumstances, the Depart-
ment will not accept as a justification for an acquisition . . . the claim that the
merger will produce [efficiencies]” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER
GUIDELINES 8 (1968))).
43 See id. at 232 (noting that since the 1982 version of the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, four circuit courts have had the occasion to consider an efficiencies
defense to a merger and all four have shown a willingness to allow the efficiencies
defense to rebut a presumption of anticompetitiveness).
44 See id. at 232.
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defense and how such a defense factors into the Clayton Act
Section 7 analysis varies from court to court.45
Courts tend to differ in the burden of proof the merging
parties must meet in order to rebut the Philadelphia National
Bank presumption.46  The Eleventh Circuit was the first to re-
ject the 1968 Guidelines approach to efficiencies, holding in
University Health that efficiencies may be used to rebut a prima
facie showing of anticompetitive effects.47  Following the Elev-
enth Circuit’s lead, the Eighth Circuit in Tenet Health found
that the combination of two hospitals could produce a “larger
and more efficient” facility able to “provide better medical care
than either of those hospitals could separately.”48  In the widely
followed decision Long Island Jewish Medical Center, the dis-
trict court placed significant limits on the efficiencies defense,
holding that the efficiencies claimed must be significant and
the merger must “enhance[ ] rather than hinder[ ] competition
because of the increased efficiencies.”49
In the most recent decisions involving the efficiencies de-
fense, courts have greatly increased the burden the merging
parties must meet in order to rebut the Philadelphia National
Bank presumption.  In evaluating a merger between two manu-
facturers of baby formula, the D.C. Circuit in Heinz held that to
rebut a presumption of anticompetitive effects based on high
market concentration levels, the merging parties must supply
“proof of extraordinary efficiencies” that are specific to the
merger.50  Building on Heinz, the Eleventh Circuit in St. Luke’s
essentially rejected all nonprice efficiencies in healthcare pro-
vider mergers, holding that although a merger would “improve
the delivery of health care,” such an efficiency gain is not suffi-
cient to rebut the Philadelphia National Bank presumption un-
less the merging parties show “that the merger would increase
45 See Peter J. Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions: Price
and Non-Price Competition in Hospital Markets, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 727, 744
n.40  (1999).
46 The 1982 Guidelines articulated the basic requirements an efficiencies
defense must meet in order to warrant consideration by regulators and courts.  To
meet these requirements, the efficiencies defense must contain clear and convinc-
ing evidence of substantial cost savings already enjoyed by other firms in the
industry that could not be realized by less anticompetitive means than the pre-
sent merger. See Kolasky & Dick, supra note 41, at 218 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF R
JUSTICE, 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.5 (1982)).
47 FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 1991).
48 FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999).
49 United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 137
(E.D.N.Y. 1997).
50 FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720–21 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, 1997 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 30–32 (1997)).
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competition or decrease prices.”51  Finally, in the most recent
decision involving an efficiencies defense, the Third Circuit in
Penn State Hershey Medical Center set forth four requirements
for efficiencies: (1) the efficiencies must “offset the anticompeti-
tive concerns in highly concentrated markets”; (2) the efficien-
cies “must be merger specific”; (3) the efficiencies “must be
verifiable, not speculative”; and (4) the efficiencies “must not
arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or service.”52
Overall, under the current state of the law, the merging parties
must offer a highly compelling efficiencies defense to overcome
the Philadelphia presumption.
II
OVERVIEW OF THE MARKET FOR HEALTHCARE SERVICES
A. Structure of the Market for Healthcare Services
In order to understand the effects of cross-market health-
care provider mergers on prices, it is important to first under-
stand the main players—healthcare providers, health
insurance payors, employers, and employees/patients—and
how they interact.  This Part examines the negotiations process
between providers, payors, employers, and patients.
First, providers and health insurance payors negotiate over
the price at which a plan will accept a hospital into its net-
work.53  A payor, for purposes of this Note, is a private health
insurance provider that reimburses the medical expenses of
patients enrolled in its health insurance plan.54  A payor seeks
to maximize the coverage of its plan at the lowest possible price
in order to make its plan as attractive as possible to employers
and patients.55  The more patients a provider currently serves,
the more attractive the provider is to a payor, since the payor
51 Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778
F.3d 775, 791 (11th Cir. 2014).
52 FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., No. 16–2365 2016 WL 5389289, at
*13–15 (3d Cir. July 26, 2016) (rejecting the merging parties’ efficiencies defense
that the merger would relieve “capacity constraints” and “engage in risk-based
contracting” because these efficiencies were “insufficient to rebut the presump-
tion of anticompetitiveness” established by the FTC’s market concentration
analysis).
53 See David A. Argue & Richard T. Shin, An Innovative Approach to an Old
Problem: Hospital Merger Simulation, 24 ANTITRUST 49, 49 (2009).
54 See Gary T. Schwartz, National Health Care Program: What Its Effect Would
Be on American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REV.  1339, 1346
(1994) (noting Medicare as an example of a nonprivate health insurance payor).
55 See OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN. MARTHA COAKLEY, EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST
TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS 28 (2010) (arguing that payors “must maintain stable,
broad provider networks”).
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maximizes its profits by enrolling as many employers and pa-
tients in its plan as possible and a high usage rate indicates
that the provider is popular with employers and patients.56  A
provider, on the other hand, seeks to maximize its revenue by
maximizing the number of patients directed to it by the
payor.57  Thus, the more patients enrolled in a payor’s plan, the
more attractive the plan is to a provider.58  In recent years,
bargaining power has shifted in favor of providers due in large
part to antitrust regulators’ inability to successfully challenge
provider mergers.59
Next, payors and employers negotiate over the price at
which an employer may enroll its employees in the payor’s
health plan.60  An employer seeks to maximize both the quality
and convenience of healthcare services for its employees at the
lowest possible price.61  Large employers that have workers liv-
ing throughout a broad geographic region will demand a health
plan that offers coverage over the entire area.62  Large employ-
ers, therefore, play an important role in cross-market mergers
where workers living in separate geographic healthcare ser-
vices markets are employed by the same firm.
Finally, patients either select a healthcare provider from
the health plan provided to them by their employers or negoti-
ate for a health plan directly with a payor.63  For the purposes
of this Note, it is assumed that all patients receive a health
insurance plan from their employer.  Since the cost of health-
care is covered by insurance, an employee is not concerned
56 See id. (providing “the total number of [patients] who are associated
with . . . the provider system” as a proxy for the provider’s leverage over a payor).
57 See Kelly J. Devers et al., Hospitals’ Negotiating Leverage with Health
Plans: How and Why Has It Changed?, 38 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 419, 422 (2003)
(examining how “[t]he threat of a plan excluding a hospital from a contract, and
channeling large blocks of patients elsewhere” impacts negotiations between
payors and providers).
58 See id.
59 Thomas R. McCarthy & Scott J. Thomas, Antitrust Issues Between Payers
and Providers, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON., Mar. 2002, at 2–3.
60 See Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 4, at 266–67. R
61 See id. at 267 (“All else equal, a health plan with a more comprehensive
provider network will be more attractive to both employers and employees.”).
62 See Argue & Shin, supra note 53, at 53 (“[A] broader set of hospital choices R
increases . . . the likelihood of a payor winning an employer’s contract.”).
63 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, over half of all workers receive
health insurance from their employer. HUBERT JANICKI, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EM-
PLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE: 2010, at 1–2 (2013), https://www.census
.gov/prod/2013pubs/p70-134.pdf [https://perma.cc/LFL6-M52U] (noting that
the percentage of workers receiving employment-based health insurance is
decreasing).
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with price when selecting a healthcare provider.64  Rather,
when selecting which provider to use, the employee is con-
cerned with nonprice factors such as quality of care and
convenience.65
B. Economic Incentives for Healthcare Providers to Merge
Economically rational firms merge because the profits gen-
erated by the merged firm will surpass the acquisition costs
expended by the merging parties.66  For healthcare providers, a
merged firm lowers its costs and increases its profits by achiev-
ing “clinical integration.”67 Clinical integration is the coordina-
tion of healthcare services across patients and facilities to
maximize the quality and value of those services.68  From an
antitrust perspective, regulators take the position that once
clinical integration has been achieved by a provider merger, the
merged entity can negotiate jointly with payors without engag-
ing in an agreement in restraint of competition.69  Following the
passage of the ACA, achieving clinical integration is especially
profitable due to the financial incentives the Act offers provid-
ers for reducing patient readmissions.70
Many experts believe that the main reason for the recent
upswing in healthcare mergers is the ACA passed in 2010.71
Section 3025 of the Act establishes the Readmissions Reduc-
tion program, which, by withholding Medicare funding, penal-
izes healthcare providers who readmit previously discharged
64 See Argue & Shin, supra note 53, at 50. R
65 See id.
66 See Ronald N. Johnson & Allen M. Parkman, Premerger Notification and the
Incentive to Merge and Litigate, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 145, 148–54  (1991).
67 AM. HOSP. ASS’N, CLINICAL INTEGRATION–THE KEY TO REAL REFORM 1 (2010),
http://www.aha.org/research/reports/tw/10feb-clinicinteg.pdf [https://perma
.cc/H7MD-P82C].
68 See STEPHEN M. SHORTELL ET AL., REMAKING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: THE
EVOLUTION OF ORGANIZED DELIVERY SYSTEMS 129 (2d ed. 2000).
69 See Deborah L. Feinstein, Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care: Proscrip-
tion, Not Prescription 2–5 (June 19, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.ftc
.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/409481/140619_aco_speech
.pdf [https://perma.cc/X559-SB68]).
70 See Kenneth Kizer, Examining Health Care Competition: Trends in Pro-
vider Consolidation 82 (Feb. 25, 2015), (transcript available at https://www.ftc
.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/618591/transcript-day2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4VYL-XPA6]) (“[T]he drive to consolidate providers is largely
driven by this need to achieve clinical integration because of the [Affordable Care
Act].”).
71 See id. at 109–11.
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patients for continued treatment of prior ailments.72  In order
to avoid readmissions, healthcare providers seek to control the
entire “continuum” of healthcare for their patients, from diag-
nosis, to treatment, to rehabilitation.73  Controlling the entire
spectrum of services, known as population health manage-
ment, reduces the possibility that an error by one provider will
result in a readmission for a different provider.74  Furthermore,
population health management allows health systems to mini-
mize the actuarial risk of any one hospital receiving an exces-
sive number of readmissions.75  In order to achieve the goal of
population health management, providers use mergers to im-
prove quality of care, increase capacity, and expand the range
of services they offer.
Clinical integration results in more efficient delivery of
healthcare services by coordinating and consolidating activities
by separate providers.76  A merger allows healthcare providers
to share patient information, leading to faster and more accu-
rate diagnoses.77  Furthermore, a merger may greatly reduce
administrative overhead costs associated with the manage-
ment of a health system.78  Finally, the merged firm may be
better able to allocate its resources by assigning physicians
and beds to correspond to the needs of its patients.79
72 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3025, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 42
U.S.C.).
73 See Laura Wood, Research and Markets, Avoiding the Readmissions Pen-
alty Zone: Population Health Management for High-Risk Populations, BUS. WIRE
(Mar. 7, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/201303070
05474/en/Research-Markets-Avoiding-Readmissions-Penalty-Zone-Population
[https://perma.cc/LDC8-X533] (noting the importance of monitoring the “care
continuum,” especially discharge facilities, in order to achieve population health
management).
74 See id.
75 See Kenneth L. Davis, Hospital Mergers Can Lower Costs and Improve
Medical Care, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2014, 7:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/kenneth-l-davis-hospital-mergers-can-lower-costs-and-improve-medical-
care-1410823048 [https://perma.cc/3XAJ-BSXA] (“[W]ithout [population health
management] there is too great a risk that . . . patients who are high utilizers of
medical services[ ] will unbalance the scales.”).
76 See SHORTELL ET AL., supra note 68, at 129. R
77 See Kizer, supra note 70, at 83. R
78 See id. at 98.
79 For example, in San Francisco, a population health management system
created a “medical respite and sobering center” where victims of alcohol abuse
could be treated at a far lower cost than in a traditional emergency room.  Jeffrey
Bendix, Experts See Potential in Population Health Management, but Obstacles
Remain, MED. ECON. (Aug. 11, 2015), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine
.com/medical-economics/news/experts-see-potential-population-health-man-
agement-obstacles-remain [https://perma.cc/8QAU-GDXD].
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III
EFFECTS OF CROSS-MARKET HEALTHCARE PROVIDER MERGERS
A. Anticompetitive Effects of Cross-Market Mergers
In the case of a cross-market merger, market concentration
following the merger is unaffected because the merging provid-
ers operate in separate geographic markets.  Therefore, pa-
tients, the consumers of healthcare services, have the same
variety of healthcare provider choices before and after the
cross-market merger.  However, empirically, the prices of a
healthcare provider increase 14 to 18% after joining an out-of-
market health system.80  Despite this increase in price, studies
indicate that the merged firm lowers its average costs by any-
where from 5 to 14%, suggesting that cross-market mergers
reduce consumer surplus.81  Typically, the increase in market
concentration caused by a merger results in higher prices as
the merged firm commands greater market power than the
merging parties held individually before the consummation of
the merger.82  This Part argues that the merged firm is able to
charge higher prices due to increased bargaining power gained
through the common consumer effect, the exploitation of differ-
ing demand elasticities for healthcare services, known as the
cross-subsidization of prices effect, and improved negotiation
skill.
1. Common Consumer Effect
Healthcare providers in separate geographic markets that
merge into a single provider system command more leverage in
negotiating for inclusion in a payor’s network because the
value of the merged firm to the payor’s network is greater than
that of the sum of the merging parties.83  If a payor’s network is
thought of as a blanket of coverage, providers that are not part
of the plan may be thought of as holes.84  Payors seek to mini-
mize the number of holes in their plans in order to make them
attractive to employers.85  By merging, healthcare providers in-
80 See Matthew S. Lewis & Kevin E. Pflum, Hospital Systems and Bargaining
Power: Evidence from Out-of-Market Acquisitions, RAND J. Econ. 22 (forthcoming
2016) (available at  https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2015/retrieve.php?pdf
id=537 [https://perma.cc/DH76-B9CL]).
81 Teresa D. Harrison, Do Mergers Really Reduce Costs?  Evidence from Hospi-
tals, 49 ECON. INQUIRY 1054, 1055 (2011).
82 See Matthew Weinberg, The Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 4 J. COMPE-
TITION L. & ECON. 433, 445–46 (2007).
83 See Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 4, at 255. R
84 See id.
85 See id. at 275.
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crease the size of the hole that would result if they were to drop
out of a payor’s health plan, thereby increasing their bargain-
ing power with the payor.86  Thus, the merger creates an “inter-
hospital linkage” in which a payor’s bargaining position with
respect to the merged firm depends on whether the payor can
contract with a second provider.87  A horizontal merger in-
creases the bargaining strength of the merged firm because it
eliminates other providers with which the payor may contract if
it fails to reach a deal with the first provider.
A cross-market merger may result in interprovider linkage
because large employers consider coverage across a payor’s
entire network when selecting a plan for its employees.88  Large
employers consider the entire extent of the plan because they
draw employees from a wide geographic area.  Figure 1, below,
illustrates a situation in which two providers operating in sepa-
rate geographic markets may increase their bargaining power
over a payor through a cross-market merger.
FIGURE 1: PATIENT DISCHARGE AREAS FOR NORTH SHORE MEDICAL
CENTER AND SOUTH SHORE HOSPITAL89
86 See id.
87 See id. at 258.
88 See id.
89 Figure 1 was generated using patient origin data from the Massachusetts
Center for Health Information and Analysis.
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Figure 1 displays the geographic extent of the patient dis-
charge areas for North Shore Medical Center in Salem, Massa-
chusetts and South Shore Hospital in South Weymouth,
Massachusetts.  The two providers are located about thirty
miles apart,90 and Figure 1 shows that the providers’ respective
patient discharge areas do not overlap, indicating that the
providers operate in separate geographic markets.  A hypothet-
ical large employer in central Boston, roughly equidistant from
North Shore and South Shore, may employ people from both
the northern and southern suburbs.91  Therefore, the large em-
ployer, in order to provide health coverage for all of its employ-
ees, would seek a plan that offers both North Shore and South
Shore.  If North Shore and South Shore were to merge and leave
a payor’s network, the merged firm would leave a hole in cover-
age for both the northern and southern suburbs, making the
plan less desirable for the large central employer.  This poten-
tial hole caused by the merged firm would be more damaging to
a payor’s plan than the potential holes caused by the merging
parties individually.92  Therefore, the merged firm would com-
mand greater bargaining leverage over a payor than that which
North Shore and South Shore commanded over the same payor
prior to the merger.
In a situation like the hypothetical North Shore-South
Shore merger where employers and patients value both of the
merging parties, the increase in bargaining power gained by the
merged firm is due to the “common consumer effect.”93  When
healthcare providers in separate geographic areas merge, the
merged firm can raise its price when there is a payor or group
of payors that negotiated with both merging parties and desires
to include both merging parties in its network.94  The closer the
proximity of the merging firms, the more likely there are com-
mon consumers and large employers, who value both parties.95
90 Driving Directions from North Shore Medical Center to South Shore Hospi-
tal, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com [https://perma.cc/3HPH-CFFG] (fol-
low “Directions” hyperlink; then search starting point field for “North Shore
Medical Center, Salem, MA” and search destination field for “South Shore Hospi-
tal, South Weymouth, MA”).
91 C.f. Dafny, supra note 6, at 92. R
92 See Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 4, at 255–58. R
93 See Dafny, supra note 6, at 91. R
94 See id. at 92
95 See id.
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2. Cross-Market Subsidization of Prices Effect
Following a cross-market merger, the merged firm may be
able to increase prices by taking advantage of differing elastici-
ties of demand in the separate geographic markets of the merg-
ing parties.96  For example, when a provider in a market with
elastic demand merges with a provider in a separate market
with inelastic demand, the merged firm may raise prices in the
inelastic market to subsidize a predatory price cut in the elastic
market.97  Predatory pricing in the elastic market serves to
drive out the competition and thus increase the concentration
of that market, ultimately resulting in higher prices.98
For cross-market price subsidization to occur, the merging
parties must negotiate for inclusion in the same payor net-
works prior to the merger.99  The merged firm may take advan-
tage of cross-market price subsidization even if it negotiates
with payors on a system-wide basis; that is, the merged firm
negotiates for a single price to include all of its facilities in the
payor’s system rather than separate prices for each individual
facility within the system.100  For example, if a provider in a
highly elastic market merges with a provider that holds a mo-
nopoly in its local market, the merged firm can charge a higher
system-wide price because payors would be unwilling to risk
losing the monopolist provider, even if it would otherwise be
willing to drop the firm in the elastic market from its net-
work.101  In this example, the provider in the elastic market
becomes more valuable to the payor simply through its associ-
ation with the monopolist.
Unlike the common consumer effect, cross-market subsi-
dization may occur even without employers that value the in-
clusion of both merging parties in its health plan.102  However,
like the common consumer effect, cross-market subsidization
will only occur when both merging parties negotiate with the
same payor.103  Since payors typically negotiate with providers
to craft networks on a statewide basis, price increases due to
96 See id. at 93.
97 See id.
98 See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Prac-
tices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697–98 (1975).
99 See Dafny, supra note 6, at 93. R
100 See Argue & Shin, supra note 53, at 52 (examining the leverage a health- R
care provider may extract by being the only provider in a certain geographic area).
101 See id.
102 See Dafny, supra note 6, at 92. R
103 See id.
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cross-market subsidization are only likely to occur when the
merging parties operate in the same state.104
3. Improved Negotiation Skill
A cross-market merger among providers may allow the
merged firm to increase its bargaining leverage through in-
creased negotiating skill.  As a result of mergers, healthcare
providers become more skilled at negotiating as the merging
parties share information about their previous negotiations
with payors.105  For example, following a series of cross-market
provider mergers that led to the creation of Tenet Healthcare in
2004, Tenet adopted a “national negotiating template and new
technology to analyze payer-specific profit and loss data, giving
negotiators ammunition during contract talks.”106  Although
the merger did not increase market concentration, Tenet was
nevertheless able to increase prices by using a shared informa-
tion system to increase bargaining leverage with payors.107
B. Pro-Competitive Effects of Cross-Market Mergers
While empirical evidence shows that prices tend to in-
crease following cross-market mergers between healthcare
providers, such evidence is unavailable until after the merger
has been consummated.108  Therefore, when a merger is re-
viewed by regulators and the courts prior to consummation,
the merging parties have the opportunity to show reasons why,
despite the concerns of anticompetitive effects described in
subpart III.A, the merger will benefit consumers.  This subpart
details two arguments the merging parties may use to dispel
concerns that their cross-market merger will have anticompeti-
tive effects: improvements in quality of care and price efficien-
cies resulting in reduced costs.
1. Improvements in Quality of Care
Even though regulators may claim that prices are likely to
increase following a cross-market merger due to the anticom-
petitive effects described in subpart IV.A, the merging parties
may concede that prices will increase but argue that such in-
104 See Scott D. Litman, Health Care Reform for the Twenty-First Century: The
Need for a Federal and State Partnership, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 871, 872
(1998).
105 See FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1049 (8th Cir. 1999).
106 Mike Colias, Ready to Rumble, 80 HOSPS. & HEALTH NETWORKS 32, 34–36
(2006).
107 See id.
108 See Lewis & Pflum, supra note 80, at 22. R
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crease will be offset by a system-wide improvement in quality of
care.109  This defense faces three main challenges when used to
support a cross-market merger: first, since the merging firms
serve different geographic markets, it is difficult to show how
the system will be able to efficiently allocate its resources to
better serve patients; second, even if the merging parties can
set forth a plan for efficient resource allocation, they must find
an empirical measurement to use as a proxy for quality of care;
and finally, the improvements in quality of care must be
merger-specific.110
The main challenge to raising a successful improvement in
care defense to a cross-market merger is the difficulty of prov-
ing improvements in quality of care with empirical evidence.
Empirical evidence shows that patient admissions to a merged
firm do not increase following either an in-market or cross-
market acquisition.111  Thus, regardless of whether the pro-
vider’s actual quality of care increases following a merger, pa-
tients do not perceive any increase in quality of the merged
firm.112  Nevertheless, the merged firm may be able to use an
increase in the “average reserve margin” of its facilities to em-
pirically suggest that the merged firm offers better care than
did the merging parties separately.113  The average reserve
margin is the number of beds a hospital keeps in reserve below
its full capacity.114  Economists frequently use average reserve
margin as a proxy for quality because physicians believe that
hospitals provide better care when they are operating below
their capacity constraints.115
2. Price Efficiencies
The merging parties may also contend that the merger will
lead to economies of scale that will reduce the price of health-
care services and ultimately benefit consumers.  One of the
109 See Hammer, supra note 45, at 759 n.85 (noting that by accurately calcu- R
lating quality adjusted prices, competition over quality “could be conceptually
reduced to a problem of price competition”).
110 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. R
111 See Lewis & Pflum, supra note 80, at 33–34. R
112 Id.
113 Paul L. Joskow, The Effects of Competition and Regulation on Hospital Bed
Supply and the Reservation Quality of the Hospital, 11 BELL J. ECON. 421, 425–26
(1980).
114 See id.
115 See Paul A. Pautler & Michael G. Vita, Hospital Market Structure, Hospital
Competition, and Consumer Welfare: What Can the Evidence Tell Us?, 10 J. CON-
TEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 117, 124 (1994) (“[I]ncreases in the average reserve mar-
gin . . . reduce[ ] expected admission delays, and . . . hospitals provide better care
when they are operating well below their capacity constraints.”).
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most commonly cited efficiencies used by merging parties is
that the merger will allow the firm to cut down on administra-
tive and overhead costs.116  However, for such a defense to be
recognized by regulators and courts, the merging parties must
show that the cost reductions arising out of this efficiency will
be passed on to consumers rather than merely being captured
by the merged firm as additional producer surplus.117  Empiri-
cal evidence from completed cross-market healthcare provider
mergers shows that while the merged firm does indeed reduce
its costs, the savings are not passed on to consumers.118
Another efficiencies defense commonly used by the merg-
ing parties is that the merger will produce economies of scale,
enabling the merged firm to lower its costs.  Economies of scale
are found when the per-patient cost of providing care declines
as the number of patients increases.119  Thus, the merging
parties would contend that the merger, by creating a health-
care provider system capable of caring for more patients, will
allow the merged firm to reduce its per-patient costs and ulti-
mately reduce its prices.120  Studies have shown that hospitals
have constant returns to scale once its size reaches 200–400
beds, meaning that any merger producing a firm capable of
treating more than 400 patients will not receive the full benefits
of economies of scale.121
Finally, the merging parties may argue that the merger will
produce economies of scope that will benefit consumers.  Econ-
omies of scope arise in healthcare mergers when resources are
shared across facilities and used jointly in treating patients,
making it cheaper to offer multiple services together than to
offer those services separately.122  Following a merger, provid-
ers may be able to shift physicians between facilities in order to
more efficiently care for patients.123  Empirical evidence sug-
116 Michael G. Vita et al., Economic Analysis in Health Care Antirust, 7 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 73, 97 (1991).
117 See id. (“[I]f cost reductions will not be passed on to consumers . . . the
[FTC] is likely to challenge an acquisition.”).
118 See Lewis & Pflum, supra note 80, at 21–22. R
119 See Vita et al., supra note 116, at 97. R
120 See id. at 98.
121 See id.; see also FRONTIER ECON., A STUDY INVESTIGATING THE EXTENT TO WHICH
THERE ARE ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND SCOPE IN HEALTHCARE MARKETS AND HOW THESE
CAN BE MEASURED BY MONITOR 11 (2012) (stating that the optimal size for an acute
hospital is 200-400 beds), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up
loads/attachment_data/file/303160/Monitor_Economies_of_Scale_and_Scope_-
_FINAL_REPORT_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WLJ-2DW4].
122 See Vita et al., supra note 116, at 97. R
123 See id. (noting that in the case of physician services, “the cost of producing
multiple outputs jointly is less than the cost of producing them separately”).
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gests that economies of scope may be achievable in certain
healthcare services such as pediatrics and emergency room
care, but overall, an economies of scope argument does not
provide strong support for an acquisition.124
IV
REVISED EVALUATION OF CROSS-MARKET MERGERS
In response to the recent surge in healthcare mergers, both
antitrust regulators and courts should be aware of the poten-
tial for anticompetitive price increases arising from cross-mar-
ket mergers.  The Horizontal Merger Guidelines, as they are
currently written and interpreted, provide insufficient guidance
for regulators and courts in evaluating cross-market mergers,
since merger review under the Guidelines is so tightly interwo-
ven with market concentration.125  In reviewing cross-market
mergers, antitrust regulators should seek to identify potential
cross-consumer effects as well as evaluate the risk of cross-
market price subsidization.126  When faced with preliminary
injunction motions in cross-market merger cases, courts
should move away from their heavy reliance on traditional mar-
ket concentration evaluations.127  Instead, courts should weigh
the potential for anticompetitive price effects, as presented by
the regulators, against the merging parties’ asserted procompe-
titive effects, taking into account the geographic limitations of
both the anticompetitive effects and the efficiencies.
A. Proposed Analysis of Cross-Market Mergers by
Antitrust Regulators
The most recent iteration of the Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines offers antitrust regulators some flexibility finding a
merger anticompetitive without defining a relevant market by
noting that “[e]vidence of competitive effects can inform market
definition, just as market definition can be informative regard-
ing competitive effects.”128  Through this language, the Guide-
lines allow regulators to bypass market definition in cases
where a merger is certain to cause anticompetitive effects.129
While this language potentially aids antitrust regulators in
124 Id. at 100 (“The evidence on economies of scope is mixed and probably
should not be used to indicate strong support for an acquisition.”).
125 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7 and accompanying text. R
126 See supra subpart II.A.
127 See Garza, supra note 38, at 5 and accompanying text. R
128 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 7. R
129 See id.
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blocking anticompetitive cross-market healthcare provider
mergers, it has two significant limitations. First, the language
does little to prevent anticompetitive mergers before they hap-
pen, since the evidence of resulting price increases, on which
the regulators must rely, does not arise until after the merger
has been consummated.  Second, the language provides little
guidance to courts that are accustomed to relying upon the
Philadelphia National Bank presumption in granting injunc-
tions to prevent anticompetitive mergers.
Since the Philadelphia National Bank presumption is ex-
plicitly based upon the anticompetitive harms of high market
concentration, in order to invoke the presumption, regulators
must define the market in which the merging parties compete
horizontally.130  Defining the market in the case of a cross-
market merger is difficult because, by definition, the merging
firms do not operate in the same geographic market.  Therefore,
a cross-market merger, under the current Guidelines, would
not result in an increase in market concentration, even though
it may result in higher prices.131  The FTC has attempted to
address this problem by ignoring the Merger Guidelines’ em-
phasis on market definition when evaluating certain cross-
market mergers and attempting to focus the court’s attention
solely on the anticompetitive effects.132  However, thus far the
FTC has only taken this approach to challenge mergers retro-
actively, after the anticompetitive effects have already oc-
curred.133  In order to proactively prevent mergers that will
produce anticompetitive effects, regulators should compile
structural evidence surrounding the deal that indicates the
potential for such anticompetitive effects.  Specifically, once a
review of the merging parties’ patient discharge data indicates
that the parties operate in separate geographic markets, the
regulator must identify the potential for common consumer
effects and cross-market subsidization.134
130 See Phila. Nat’l Bank v. United States, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
131 See Lewis & Pflum, supra note 80, at 22. R
132 See in re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 9315, at 87 (2008) (“[I]t
is appropriate to prove anticompetitive effects through direct evidence in place of
market definition.”).
133 See Schencker, supra note 9 (quoting antitrust expert Jeff Miles claiming R
“[t]he FTC has not brought a cross-market merger case, but there’s a good deal
of . . . economic research going on looking into a theory under which they can be
challenged”).
134 If the patient discharge data indicates that the parties operate within the
same geographic market, traditional Horizontal Merger Analysis under the Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines should apply. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
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First, to identify the potential for anticompetitive common
consumer effects arising from a cross-market merger, regula-
tors must closely analyze the geographic relationship between
the merging parties.  To begin, regulators should identify
whether the merging parties operate any facilities within the
same state and examine whether the parties negotiate with any
of the same payors.135  The locations of the parties’ facilities
likely will be available publicly on the parties’ websites or, if the
merger involves a large enough value, in the parties’ premerger
notification filing.136  The regulators must then contact payors
who offer plans in the regions the merging parties operate to
determine if the parties negotiate with any of the same
payors.137  If the parties operate facilities in the same state and
negotiate with any of the same payors, anticompetitive com-
mon consumer effects are possible.
Next, regulators must obtain additional evidence from
payors and employers to determine whether common con-
sumer effects are likely enough to warrant blocking the merger.
The regulator must examine more carefully the parties’ patient
discharge information to gauge the possibility that an employer
operating within or in between the separate geographic mar-
kets of the merging parties might value the inclusion for both
parties in its health plan for the benefit of its employees.138  For
example, in the hypothetical North Shore-South Shore merger,
where the merging parties’ facilities are a mere thirty miles
apart and between them lays central Boston, it is likely that an
employer would have workers who live in both the northern
and southern suburbs.  This hypothetical central Boston em-
ployer would want access to both of the merging providers in its
health plan.  Using patient discharge data, regulators can de-
termine the distance patients are willing to travel for care at a
given healthcare facility.139  Figure 2, below, details how, by
note 7, at 13–14 (describing how to define a geographic market based on the R
location of customers).
135 In general, payors must operate facilities in the same state in order to
negotiate with the same payors. See Colias, supra note 106, at 33. R
136 Addresses at which the parties conduct business must be included in the
parties’ premerger notification form. Antitrust Improvements Act Notification and
Report Form for Certain Mergers and Acquisitions, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/sys-
tem/files/attachments/form-instructions/instructions_-_final_05-13-14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6GWU-U84E].
137 See supra section II.A.1.
138 See Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 4, at 255–57 and accompanying text. R
139 See, e.g., Fig. 1; supra note 89.  The distance patients are willing to travel is R
represented by the edge of the patient discharge area for North Shore and South
Shore.
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using this information on patients’ willingness to travel for
healthcare and the typical commute distance for the area in
which the merging parties operate, regulators may determine,
as a threshold matter, whether any common consumers are
likely to exist.140
FIGURE 2: EXAMINING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A COMMON CONSUMER
C = Typical Commute Distance
Pa = Distance patients are willing to travel to Provider A’s
facility
Pb = Distance patients are willing to travel to Provider B’s
facility
D = Distance between Provider A and Provider B










In Figure 2, Pa and Pb represent the radius of the patient
discharge areas for Provider A and Provider B’s facilities re-
spectively.  Thus, if the distance between Pa and Pb is less than
2*C, the diameter of the circle representing the typical com-
mute distance for the metropolitan area in which Provider A
and Provider B operate, an employer could draw a typical com-
muter from both Provider A and Provider B’s patient discharge
area.  Therefore, as a threshold matter, under these conditions,
a common consumer is likely to exist.
140 ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & NATALIE HOLMES, BROOKINGS, THE GROWING DISTANCE
BETWEEN PEOPLE AND JOBS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 3 (2015).
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If, as a threshold matter, common consumers of the two
merging parties are likely, then regulators should proceed by
contacting large employers in the area of concern to determine
if employers in the area value including both providers in its
health plan.141  If both providers are valued by local employers,
the regulators should next interview payors to evaluate the
bargaining power of the merging parties and the prospective
power of the merged firm.  Specifically, the regulators would
need to determine if payors would be willing to drop the merged
firm from its network if the firm threatened a SSNIP.142  When
obtaining evidence from payors, regulators must be mindful of
the risk that payors will fabricate claims in order to shift bar-
gaining power over providers in their favor.143  Despite the fact
that the merging parties operate in separate geographic mar-
kets, if the regulators determine that employers desire both
parties in their health plans and payors would be unable to
resist a SSNIP from the merged firm, then the common con-
sumer effect is likely to cause an increase in prices following
the merger and the regulator may choose to block the merger.
Next, the regulators must evaluate the potential for an-
ticompetitive effects arising from cross-market subsidization of
prices.  Like the common consumer effect, for cross-market
subsidization to occur, there must exist payors that negotiate
with both parties.144  If such common payors exist, regulators
must examine the elasticity of demand for healthcare in the
separate geographic markets of the merging parties.145  Elas-
ticity of demand is the absolute value of the ratio of the percent
change in quantity demanded for a product to the percent
change in price of that product.146  An elasticity value less than
one indicates that the market is inelastic while a value greater
than one indicates that the market is elastic.147  In an inelastic
market, consumer demand is not heavily dependent on price
while in an elastic market, consumers are highly sensitive to
141 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. R
142 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 9–10. R
143 Providers and payors are engaged in an ongoing battle over bargaining
power in negotiations. See McCarthy & Thomas, supra note 59, at 2–5. R
144 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. R
145 Cross-market subsidization of prices occurs when the merged firm exploits
differences in elasticity between the separate geographic markets of the merging
parties. See Dafny, supra note 6, at 89–90 and accompanying text. R
146 JEANNE S. RINGEL ET AL., RAND, THE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE: A
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM 9
(2002).
147 Furthermore, a value of zero indicates that the market is perfectly inelastic
while an infinite value indicates the market is perfectly elastic. See id. at 10.
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price when making their purchasing decisions.148  Therefore,
in the context of healthcare providers, a provider in an inelastic
market will lose fewer consumers following a price increase
than a provider in an elastic market.
Calculating elasticity for healthcare services markets
presents a unique challenge because the consumers who re-
spond to price are payors rather than the patients who ulti-
mately consume the services.149  From a payor’s perspective,
the value of including a provider in its plan increases as the
number of possible substitute providers in that market de-
creases.150  Market concentration serves as a good proxy for
market elasticity since a payor would be less sensitive to an
increase in price in a market with many substitute provid-
ers.151  A highly concentrated market is likely to be inelastic
while an unconcentrated market is likely to be elastic.152
Thus, in evaluating the elasticity of demand for a particular
healthcare market, regulators should begin by calculating mar-
ket concentration for the market.153
Next, regulators should consider whether there is a signifi-
cant difference in market concentration between the separate
geographic markets of the merging parties, where one market
is highly concentrated while the other is unconcentrated.154  A
significant difference in market concentration suggests a paral-
lel difference in elasticity between the markets.155  The merged
firm could potentially exploit this difference in elasticity by
raising prices in the inelastic market to subsidize predatory
prices in the elastic market.156  If such conditions are present,
regulators should inquire as to whether payors would be will-
ing to lose the merged firm from its network if the merged firm
148 See id.
149 See Argue & Shin, supra note 53, at 50. R
150 See Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 4, at 266–67. R
151 See id.
152 See supra section II.A.2.
153 To calculate the market share for a given provider, take the number of beds
operated by that provider divided by the total number of beds in the market. See
supra note 30 and accompanying text.  Use the market shares for firms in the R
market to calculate the HHI market concentration. See supra note 31 and accom- R
panying text.
154 An unconcentrated market has an HHI below 1500 while a highly concen-
trated market has an HHI above 2500. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note
7, at 18; see supra note 31 and accompanying text. R
155 See Dafny, supra note 6, at 93. R
156 See id.
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threatened a SSNIP.157  If the payors will negotiate with the
merged firm on a system-wide rather than a facility-by-facility
basis, regulators should ask the payors whether they would be
willing to pay the merged firm a higher price to keep coverage in
the inelastic market.158  Ultimately, if the merged firm would
gain negotiating leverage because of its presence in the highly
concentrated, inelastic market, the merger may result in signif-
icant anticompetitive effects due to cross-market price
subsidization.
B. Proposed Analysis of Cross-Market Mergers by Courts
Under the current approach to granting preliminary in-
junctions in hospital merger cases, courts place great weight
on market concentration.159  However, market concentration
may not paint a complete picture of the anticompetitive effects
that may arise from cross-market mergers.  As the economic
analysis of cross-market mergers continues to improve, courts
will give more weight to the antitrust regulators’ arguments on
potential anticompetitive effects.  The amount of weight courts
should give to the potential anticompetitive effects ultimately
depends on the extent to which the conditions surrounding the
merger suggest the potential for harm to consumers.160  This
section assumes that the evidence presented by the regulators
is sufficient to establish a prima facie case that the merger will
result in anticompetitive effects.  In response, the merging par-
ties may offer an improvement in care or a price efficiencies
defense to argue that the merger is not in fact anticompetitive.
This subpart examines how courts should evaluate these de-
fenses in light of the goals of the ACA, the true motives behind
the merger, and the unique aspects of cross-market mergers
that present challenges to achieving efficiencies.
Courts should be wary of improvement in care defenses
where the primary motivation behind the merger was to reduce
costs or increase the bargaining power of the merged firm.  The
merging parties may allege that an increase in price following
the merger does not reduce consumer surplus because it is
offset by an improvement in quality.  Courts should give great
157 The merged provider can exploit the payor’s need to offer coverage in the
inelastic market by charging a higher price for this market individually or for its
system as a whole. See id.
158 See id.
159 See Garza, supra note 38, at 4. R
160 The court must evaluate whether the conditions surrounding the merger
are such so as to give rise to the common consumer effect or cross-market price
subsidization. See section III.C.1.
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weight to this defense since the ACA expresses Congress’ intent
to encourage healthcare providers to improve quality of care.161
The merging parties may use average reserve margin as a proxy
for quality to argue that the merger improves quality of care by
increasing the level of resources available per patient.162  The
merging parties may also claim that the merger will improve
system-wide access to physicians.163  However, regulators and
courts may be able to undermine the improvement in quality of
care defense if correspondence between the merging parties
indicates that a primary motivation behind the merger is to
reduce costs or eliminate competition.  Courts should be skep-
tical of alleged improvements in quality where the primary mo-
tivation of the merger is cost reduction, since effective clinical
integration is typically not found where a merger was initiated
to reduce costs or increase bargaining power with payors.164
The merging parties could also contend that the merger
will produce price efficiencies that would enable the merged
firm to lower costs and pass the savings on to consumers.  This
efficiencies defense contends that increasing the scale of pro-
duction would allow the firm to allocate resources more effi-
ciently, reducing the length of patient stays without
compromising quality.165  Generally, however, to take advan-
tage of economies of scale, the healthcare facilities in the
merged firm must be able to effectively coordinate their opera-
tions.166  Thus, courts should discount this defense when the
distance between the merging parties makes it unlikely that
the merged firm will be able to effectively coordinate its opera-
tions to improve care.  Because patients are so concerned with
convenience when selecting healthcare providers, in some
161 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3025, supra note 72 and R
accompanying text.
162 See Pautler & Vita, supra note 115, at 124. R
163 Scott Baltic, Monopolizing Medicine: Why Hospitals’ Quest to Control
Healthcare Costs is a Losing Game, 91 MED. ECON., Feb. 25, 2014, at 20, 27
(“[C]onsolidation . . . undertaken ‘primarily for the purpose of enhanced bargain-
ing power with payers’ . . . did not lead to true integration nor to enhanced
performance.” (quoting Martin Gaynor & Robert Town, The Impact of Hospital
Consolidation-Update, SYNTHESIS PROJECT (2012))).
164 See id.
165 See Aileen Clarke, Why Are We Trying to Reduce Length of Stay?  Evalua-
tion of the Costs and Benefits of Reducing Time in Hospital Must Start from the
Objectives that Govern the Change, 5 QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE 172 (1996)
(“[R]eductions of time spent in hospital will reduce costs without compromising
patient outcomes.”).
166 See Davis, supra note 5 (“Population health management means services R
must be coordinated . . . .  This requires hospital systems to provide a full suite of
services for their patient populations, warranting expansion through acquisitions
of other hospitals . . . .”).
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cases they will be unwilling to travel to a distant facility, even if
it is better suited for treating that patient than a nearby facil-
ity.167  One estimate suggests that patients are willing to travel
a maximum of seventy-five miles for healthcare.168  This means
that the ability of the merged firm to direct patients to the most
efficient and highest quality treatment option is limited by the
distance patients are willing to travel for healthcare.169  Since
the merging parties to a cross-market merger operate in sepa-
rate geographic markets, any plan to improve quality of care
would only be viable if the parties can show that patients would
be willing to travel the distance between the separate geo-
graphic markets in order to receive healthcare.170
CONCLUSION
Cross-market mergers between healthcare providers, until
recently viewed as harmless by antitrust regulators and courts,
may have anticompetitive effects that harm American consum-
ers.  The potential for anticompetitive effects from cross-market
healthcare provider mergers is greatly enhanced by the fact
that healthcare mergers are occurring more frequently now
more than ever and being driven by the incentives of the
ACA.171  Regulators have already shown a willingness to ad-
dress this problem, but with relatively few sources of economic
proof indicating price effects following cross-market mergers,
the FTC and the DOJ are left with little ammunition to block a
potentially anticompetitive cross-market merger in court.  As
economic analysis of cross-market mergers improves, regula-
167 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  Patients’ willingness to travel R
for healthcare varies across different regions of the country.  For example, data
from the Washington State Office of Financial Management show that an average
adult is willing to travel 20.4 miles for routine care and twenty-two miles for
urgent care. WEI YEN, WASH. STATE OFF. OF FIN. MGMT., HOW LONG AND HOW FAR DO
ADULTS TRAVEL AND WILL ADULTS TRAVEL FOR PRIMARY CARE? (2013), http://www
.ofm.wa.gov/researchbriefs/2013/brief070.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6L2-J3DF].
168 See Lewis & Pflum, supra note 80, at 22. R
169 Based on the Lewis-Pflum estimate, a patient living at the midpoint be-
tween the merging parties’ facilities would be willing to travel seventy-five miles in
either direction for care, meaning that the facilities must be a maximum of 150
miles apart in order to result in an improvement in quality of care. See id.
170 For example, consider the hypothetical merger between North Shore and
South Shore discussed in section II.A.1.  Although North Shore and South Shore
do not currently attract the same patients, the parties, by taking a survey from
their current patients, may be able to show that their patients would be willing to
travel thirty miles further to use the other facility, especially to receive specialized
care.
171 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. R
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tors will be able to predict more accurately the conditions that
cause cross-market mergers to increase prices.
By and large, price increases following cross-market merg-
ers are due to the increase in bargaining power the merged firm
gains over health insurance payors with whom the merging
parties negotiated prior to the merger.  Increased bargaining
power following a cross-market merger may result from either
the common consumer effect or cross-subsidization of prices.
This Note sets forth tactics regulators may employ to identify
conditions that lead to these effects so that regulators may
block anticompetitive cross-market healthcare provider merg-
ers before they are consummated.  To assist in identifying the
potential for the common consumer effect, this Note offers a
threshold analysis whereby regulators may use both consum-
ers’ willingness to commute in an area and consumers’ willing-
ness to travel for healthcare to suggest the potential for a
common consumer between two merging parties.  In the future,
regulators may improve upon this threshold analysis by ac-
counting for population distribution in the area between the
providers as well as workers that commute further than the
typical commute distance for the relevant area.  Furthermore,
with more information on the actual economic effects of cross-
market mergers, regression analysis might be used to identify a
causal relationship between the existence of common consum-
ers or a differential in market elasticity between the merging
firms and increases in price for healthcare following a
merger.172
This Note advocates taking a more open approach to the
traditional balancing of anticompetitive and procompetitive ef-
fects of mergers.  Courts must consider both arguments from
the regulators suggesting conditions surrounding the merger
that indicate the potential for price increases and arguments
from the merging parties that the merger will in fact result in
higher quality care or efficiencies leading to lower prices.  Ad-
vising courts on a general course of action is difficult because
there is a broad range of ways in which modern courts analyze
efficiencies defenses.173  Furthermore, courts must not place
too much weight on potential anticompetitive effects so as to
prevent or deter beneficial mergers that further Congress’ in-
172 See Alan O. Sykes, An Introduction to Regression Analysis 3 (Univ. of Chi.
Law Sch., Law & Econs., Paper No. 20, 1992), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
files/files/20.Sykes_.Regression_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/V79G-6ZGX] (explain-
ing how regression analysis may be used to test hypotheses “about the relation-
ship between the variables of interest”).
173 See supra section II.A.3.
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tent of improving care embodied in the ACA.174  This Note pro-
vides guidance on when courts should discount the merging
parties’ improvements in quality and price efficiencies defenses
in light of the likelihood of anticompetitive effects.
174 See supra note 70–71 and accompanying text. R
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